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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #02801-85/1
31 May 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution

FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

SUBJECT: 22 May 1985 East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting and
Special Interagency Philippine Analytic Group Meeting

1. Representatives of the Intelligence Community met on 22 May 1985 to consider the attached subjects.
2. Next month's Warning and Forecast Meeting will be held on 19 June 1985 at 1400 hours in Room 7E62, CIA Headquarters. The Special Interagency Philippine Analytic Group Meeting will immediately follow the Warning Meeting. Recommendations for discussions/warning topics should be forwarded to this office by 5 June 1985.
3. Attendees from outside agencies are advised to arrive early to avoid parking problems created by construction work. For your convenience, please enter the compound through Gate 1, the Route 123 entrance. Please phone attendance intentions to [redacted] and have your clearances verified to us by your security office by COB 17 June 1985.

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Repia V Smith for
Carl W. Ford, Jr.

Attachment:
22 May 1985 Warning and Forecast Report
and Special Interagency Philippine Analytic Group
Meeting

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC #02801-85
31 May 1985

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

SUBJECT: 22 May 1985 East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting and
Special Interagency Philippine Analytic Group Meeting

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Leadership Tensions in the PRC

[] OEA, discussed the implications of leadership tensions in the PRC for the upcoming Party Conference of Delegates. There is not agreement among analysts over just how much disagreement and how volatile it is among the PRC leaders. It is not uncommon before a major Party meeting for some disagreements to surface; this is especially likely because of the bumpy road the current economic reforms have experienced. The reforms have unquestionably caused some strains among the leadership, and since personal ties are the essence of politics in China, there will continue to be reports of personal animosities among them. Nevertheless, Deng and Zhao appear to be undeterred in accomplishing their major objective of sweeping changes at the first secretary level in the provinces. Chen Yun and others may not be pleased with the changes, but they can do little to stop them.

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There are essentially two views on opposition to the reforms. In the first view, opponents want to roll back the reforms; consequently, they pick out the faults and failings of the reforms in hopes of slowing or reversing them. The second view [] has it that the opponents have already essentially lost the battle and are only putting up a rearguard action which can do little to stem the tide of reform. While Hu and some other leaders have made mistakes, this has not brought about a diminution of their authority. [] predicted that the upcoming meetings would witness a further consolidation of the reformers authority, including Hu's achievement of inheriting the Chairmanship of the Party Military Commission from Deng. The military has been and will continue to be acquiescent in the push for further reform.

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While not likely, there are some things that might deter the reforms. Deng's sudden departure would face the party with a decision of whether to go to one of the old guard or move to a younger successor -- a kind of

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Chernenko-Gorbochov decision the Soviets were recently faced with. If the reforms were going very badly or if the Party appeared to be suffering a dramatic loss of authority the reforms could face difficulty; however, the opposition now comes from some tired old men who will not be able to change things. The reformers have Central Committee endorsement of their goals.

With respect to foreign policy, such things as the cancellation of the ship visit are probably not major items on the ambitious Chinese agenda. Deng probably favors better relations with the USSR as most Chinese leaders do; in fact, there is little solid evidence of polarization among the leadership over these major foreign policy issues. Neither Deng nor Hu Yaobang is a friend of the US, and Hu especially seems to be highly suspicious of the US on the Taiwan question.

Forecast: The reformers will continue to consolidate their position at the upcoming Party Conference, and critics of these reform policies will sustain further setbacks.

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Resumption of North-South Korea Talks

[] OEA, led a discussion of the prospects for the North-South Korea talks. There does not appear to be significant chance for any early breakthroughs in either the economic talks or the Red Cross talks. Each side has a differing approach. North Korea wants to most quickly toward broad discussions of political and security questions. South Korea wants a more gradual, confidence-building, approach to low-level trade and humanitarian questions before moving on to the more sweeping issues. This is similar to the differing approaches which characterized both sides in their talks during the early 1970s. The North wants to use the dialogue to move quickly toward tripartite talks which would involve the United States. The South, aware of the DPRK's objectives, wants to move much more slowly. The North is probably disappointed at the lack of response to its parliamentary initiative from the South and was casting doubts on the feasibility of the Red Cross talks as a means of expressing its dissatisfaction.

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Forecast: No major breakthroughs in present talks.

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #02424-85
10 May 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution

FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

SUBJECT: Proposed Agenda for the 22 May 1985 East Asia
Warning and Forecast Meeting

1. The monthly Warning and Forecast Meeting is scheduled for Wednesday, 22 May 1985, at 1400 hours in Room 7E62, CIA Headquarters.

2. Participants should be prepared to discuss the following topics. Keep in mind that our objective is to identify collection gaps and make forecasts rather than review current intelligence.

3. At this meeting we will discuss and make forecasts concerning the following topics:

1400-1410 Opening remarks and impressions gained during recent TDY to SE Asia NIO/EA

1410-1420

[Redacted]

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1420-1425 Discussion

1425-1435 Leadership tensions in the PRC--implications for the Plenum [Redacted]

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1435-1440 Discussion

1440-1450 Resumption of North-South Korea talks--
Atmospherics/Outlook [Redacted]

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